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Abs[ruct
The socioeconomic movement is an effort to better explain human behavior by combining
insights of economists and sociologists. This paper contributes to the socioeconomic literature by
including the influence ofrelatlonships, values, and social bonds In the neoclassical economic model
by introducing social capital coefficients. The usefulness of the resulting social capital model is
demonstrated theoretically in a two-firm cooperative model and tested empirically using data from
a survey of students who allocate their time between individual and joint projects.
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Introduction
According to socioeconomists, individual
choices are shaped by values, emotions, social
bonds, and judgments, rather than by a precise
calculation of self-interest (Coughlin). The
socioeconomic movement may bc traced to Weber
who popularized the term in the 1890s. Hc
intended to reconcile two conflicting schools of
economists: the historical school led by the German
economist Gustav von Schmoller and the
neoclassical school led by Carl Mengcr.
Weber believed that real progress in
economics depended on the contributions of both
historical and theoretical economics. Despite
Weber’s effort, the synthesis failed and economics
moved away from the study of social bonds and
networks. Afterwards, neoclassical economic theory
increasingly described economic agents as
connected to each other through monetary
exchanges (Swedberg).
Economists have expressed increasing
confidence that their approach can be used to solve
problems previously considered to be the domain of
other social sciences. Indicative of economists’
expansive agenda is Becker’s (1976b) claim that:
“...the economic approach is applicable to ‘all
human behavior’” and Hirshleifer’s ( 1985) view that
!,... social sciences will soon become increasingly
indistinguishable from economics.”
As economic inquiry has been extended
into areas previously examined by sociologists, the
differences between the underlying assumptions of
economists and sociologists have become more
focused. Swcdberg characterized these differences
as follows. Economists focus on individual actors
with freedom of action who make rational self-
intcrested calculations in the market. Sociologists
view actions as collective, constrained by social
structures, motivated by irrational feelings,
traditions, and values, occurring everywhere but in
the market.
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Economists and sociologists have important
insights that can be combined to better explain and
predict economic behavior. In what follows, we
review the literature supporting economists’
emphasis on self-interest and that supporting the
view that relationships modify agents’ pursuit of
self-interest. Next, relationships are introduced into
the neoclassical utility-maximizing model using
social capital coefficients and the resulting model is
used to demonstrate that important economic
outcomes may depend on social capital. Then, we
report on a study conducted among students who
were asked how they would allocate their time
between individual projects and joint projects
depending on who was their teammate. Finally, this
paper concludes with a summary.
The Assumption of Self-Interest
Edgeworth, a famous 19th century
economist, wrote that: “The first principle of
Economics is that eve~y agent is actuated only by
self-interest” (Rcscher). Supporting this view,
Mueller wrote:
“And, I submit, the only
assumption essential to a
descriptive and predictive science
of human behavior is egoism. ”
Tullock, convinced of the importance of
self-interest wrote: “...the average human being is
about 95 percent selfish in the narrow sense of the
term” (as quoted by Mansbridge, 1990, p. 12).
Adam Smith ( 1776) declared: “It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest” (p. 25).
Quirk and Saposnik defended the
assumption of selfish preferences because alternative
assumptions precluded the deduction of interesting
theorems:
“...thc specification of assuming
rankings defined with respect to
own commodity bundles turns out
to be virtually impossible to avoid
if any interesting theorems
concerning the operation of the
economy are to bc formulated.
This extremely important
restriction on the preferences of
consumers is referred to as the
condition of selfishness of
preferences.”
Commenting on the neoclassical paradigm
and its focus on self-interest, Etzioni wrote:
“The neoclassical paradigm, we
have seen, attempts to show not
merely that there is an element of
pleasure (self-interest) in all
seemingly altruistic behavior, but
that self-interest can explain it
all. ”
While some in society lament increasing
selfishness, most neoclassical economists are not
alarmed. Instead, they believe Adam Smith’s
invisible and selfish hand promotes society’s best
interest. Arrow and Hahn wrote:
“There is by now a long and
fairly imposing line of economists
from Adam Smith to the present
who have sought to show that a
decentralized economy motivated
by self-~ nterest...would be
compatible with a coherent
disposition of economic resources
that could be regarded, in a well-
defined sense, as superior to a
large class of possible alternative
dispositions...”
Criticism of Self-Interest
The assumption that economic agents act
selfishly is rarely tested by economists. Instead,
tastes, expectations, and preferences are defined in
such a way that whatever behavior is observed can
be explained by a self-interested pursuit. Sen
complained: “It is possible to define a person’s
interest in such a way that no matter what he does ,,
can be seen as furthering hls own interests in every
isolated act of choice. ”
Cross observed:
“...we often overlook the fact that
the empirical ‘success’ of many
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derived from accommodating
adjustments in complementary
hypotheses... Market data are used
to make inferences about the
nature of preferences,
expectations, and production
functions through the mediating
assumption of maximizing
behavior, and unless these
inferences are independently
validated, it is impossible to
uncover violations of the
intermediary hypothesis. ..”
Economic analysis that begins with the
tautology “that whatever we do is motivated by self-
interest” precludes the examination of other
reasonable assumptions about behavior, One such
alternative assumption generally accepted by
sociologists is that relationships matter. In the next
section, evidence supporting the assumption that
relationships matter is presented.
Evidence That Relationships Matter
The mainstream neoclassical view is that
the identity of participants in an orgdnized market
does not affect market outcomes (Telser and
Higinbotham). Schmid and Robison discuss recent
experiments that reject this view. Other evidence
that relationships matter follows.
When farmland sales are recorded, a
distinction is made between land sales between
family members and “arms-length” sales made
between non-related individuals. The distinction is
made because realtors recognize that the sale prices
of land depend on the relationship between the
seller and buyer (Gilliland).
Nepotism laws impose restrictions on close
relatives being hired by the government in the same
agency. These laws recognize the tendency of
government employers to grant advantages to their
relatives. Civil rights laws preclude employment
being denied when the basis of the discrimination is
race. These laws recognize that race, a special kind
of relationship, sometimes influences employment
decisions.
Our judicial system emphasizes the role of
relationships by placing a blindfold on our symbol
of the court, Lady Justice. The blindfold helps her
make impartial judgments free from the bias created
by her knowing who is to be judged. Those who
frequent restaurants nearly always leave tips, even
when they do not expect to be waited on again by
the same server. Finally, reviews of articles
submitted to many professional journals are
conducted anonymously. Unless relationships
influenced reviews, anonymity in the review process
would be unnecessary. Anonymity, however,
appears to be justified since the evidence indicates
relationships do influence the outcomes of the
review process (Blank).
Etzioni wrote that a considerable body of
experimental data is not consistent with the
assumption of selfish preferences. For example,
several experiments show that many people mail
back “lost” wallets to strangers, cash intact
(Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes, [968). [n one
study, 64 percent of the subjects returned a lost
contribution to an “Institute for Research in
Mcdicinc” (Hornstein et al., 1971, p. I IO;
Homstein, 1976, pp. 95-96). In another study, 59
percent of those surveyed said they would donate
bone marrow for strangers (Schwartz). An
additional 24 percent indicated at least an even
chance that they would donate bone marrow if
called upon,
Frank summarizes the conflict between the
assumption of selfish preferences in economics and
observed preferences:
“...Economists, for their part,
point with pride to the power of
self-interest to explain and predict
behavior, not only in the world of
commerce but in networks of
personal relationships as well.
And yet, the plain fact is that
many people do not fit the me-
first caricature. They give
anonymously to public television
stations and private charities.
They donate bone marrow to
strangers with leukemia. They
endure great trouble and expense
to see justice done, even when it
will not undo the original injury.
At great risk to themselves, they
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buildings, and jump into icy rivers
to rescue people who are about to
drown. Soldiers throw their
bodies atop live grenades to save
their comrades. Seen through the
lens of modern self-interest
theory, such behavior is the
human equivalent of piancts
traveling in square orbits. ”
In contrast to the evidcncc that
relationships and values matter, one recent study
confirms that economists practice what they teach
about scltlshness, In a study designed to test
willingness to contribute to a social versus a private
account, Maxwell and Ames found that economics
students contributed an average of only 20 percent
of their endowments to the public account,
significantly less than the 49 percent average for all
other subjects. 1
Perhaps supported by observations of their
own behavior, some economists continue to reject
the view that relationships matter. Hirshlcifer’s
(1994) rcccnt Presidential Address to the Western
Economics Association reaffirmed his faith in
selfish preferences:
“...I am among those who remain
skeptical about the significance of
self-reported contributions to
charity, or about behavior in
hypothetical or small-stakes
Prisoners’ Dilemma experiments.
My guess is that economists are
not more selfish, but only more
acceptant of human selfishness as
a fact of life. ”
Hirshleifer may bc justified in his
skepticism of self-reported experimental results; at
least when the subjects are students of economics.
Three professors at George Washington University
recently set out to test if, in fact, economics
students are as selfish as they reported. They
dropped stamped, addressed envelopes containing
$10 in cash in different classrooms. Of the
envelopes dropped in the economics classrooms, 56
percent were returned with the money. Only 31
percent of the envelopes dropped in history,
psychology, and business classes were returned. It
appears that economics students aren’t any more
seltisb than other students—they just claim to be
(Bennett).
The Altruism Literature
Some important work has extended the
neoclassical model beyond its traditional focus on
selfishness. Onc extension of tbe neoclassical
model assumes an altruistic agent has a taste for
philanthropy. Characteristic of this work is
Schwartz (1970) and Feldstein and Taylor ( 1976).
A second extension of the self-interested
neoclassical model treats the iti’person’s utility as
dependent on own consumption of good x, and the
/’i’person’s utiIity function U,. Hence, the it”person
maximizes U,=j(x,, U,). In this model, tbe utility of
the ,j’i’person is treated as a consumer good that
person i consumes in an effort to increase his or ber
self-interest (Bernhcim and Stark),
A third approach that goes beyond self-
interestcd motivations is the club model. At the
heart of this approach is the assumption that the
desire to belong to the club Icads to bchawor
consistent with the objectives of the club.
Stil I other extensions of the neoclassical
model recognize relationships among family
members as affecting economic behavior. These
efforts recognize that family members may act in
each other’s interest. Becker’s (198 I) famous work
formalizes some interesting conclusion for agents
whose well-being depends on the well-being of
other family members. Consistent with the focus on
the family are studies linking altruism to genetic
fitness (Samuel son, Dawkins, and Becker (1976a)).
Social Capital Theory
The essence of the neoclassical paradigm is
the assumption of rational decision makers with
stable preferences who maximize own utility usually
defined over own consumption bundles. In
addition, most applications of the neoclassical model
assume selfishness of preferences. In this paper, the
assulnptions that decision makers are rational and
maximize own utility are accepted. Rejected in this
paper, however, is the assumption of selfishness of
preferences. lnstcad, we accept the assumption ofJ Agr and Applied Econ July 1995 47
socioeconomists that relationships matter, By
recognizing that relationships matter we intend to
extend the traditional altrwsm models by identifying
what relationships matter and how relationships
influence the attainment of socially desirable goals.
The intellectual foundation for the social
capital approach adopted in this study can be traced
to Adam Smith (1759) who recognized that wc are
influenced by the well-being of others. He wrote:
“How selfish soever man may be
supposed, there arc evidently
some principles in his nature,
which interest him in the fortune
of others, and render their
happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it,
except the pleasure of seeing it”
(p. 3).
Smith (1759) described the link between
relationships and vicarious sensing of well-being as
follows:
“Every man feels his own
pleasures and his own pains more
sensibly than those of other
people...After himself, the
members of his own family, those
who usually live in the same
house with him, his parents, his
children, his brothers and sisters,
arc naturally the objects of his
warmest affection” (p. 32 I).
Social capital is used in this paper to model
the important insights of Smith. The concept of
social capital has been introduced to agricultural
economists by Robison and Schmid (1989, 1994),
Robison and Hanson, and Schmid and Robison.
Coleman introduced social capital to sociologists
and Hyden discussed it in a political science setting.
Putnam suggested recently that its supply in the
United States has decreased.
The underlying assumption of social capital
theory is that relationships matter. Relationships are
represented by social capital coefficients K,, which
model the degree to which person i’s well-being is
influenced by the well-being of person, place, or
thing.j. Person i may develop a relationship toward
person, place, or thing ,j of sympathy (K,,>O),
antipathy (K,,<O), or neutrality (K,,=O) (Bogardus).
However, the reverse is not always true. Places and
things arc not usually assumed to be capable of a
relationship with person i. That is, i must be a
person capable of vicarious sensing to have a
relationship with person, place, or thing ,j.
The object of i’s social capital j may
include not only persons, but pets, one’s country,
community, or favorite sports team. Much that has
been written about endowment effects suggests
social capital can also develop toward inanimate
objects such as coffee mugs and pens (Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) and (1990)).
The magnitude and sign of the social
capital coefficient K,, is assumed to depend on i’s
preferences and values compared to important
characteristics of person, place, or thing j as
perceived by i. If,j is a person who likes the same
things and holds the same values as i, the
relationship is expected to be sympathetic. On the
other hand, if i views j as a competitor in a zero
sum game, the relationship is likely to be
antipathetic even when the competitors are family
members. Because of its negative effect on
relationships, i and ,j often create institutions
designed to reduce personalized competition.
Social capital coefficients also depend on
social distance or awareness (Park), Relationships
between i and j can develop only if i is aware of j.
An infinite social distance implies that i is not
aware Of]”’s existence and K,, is zero.
Social capital may also be measured toward
oneself. One’s own social capital coefficient K,,
reflects the results of a self-evaluation process that
monitors and compares one’s own behavior to an
internalized and accepted set of values. Actions
consistent with one’s internalized set of values may
increase one’s own social capital. Thus, an
economic agent may increase his or her sense of
well-being without an increase in his or her income,
wealth, or profits. In fact, one may reduce one’s
material well-being to maintain or improve one’s
self-relationship measured. This occurs when one
donates to charities, returns lost or stolen items, and
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The interaction between one’s own utility
and one’s own social capital may explain much of
what we have come to view as moral or
philanthropic behavior. That is, the source of one’s
revenue may affect one’s own social capital. For
example, most avoid stealing. The motivation for
honesty is less out of fear of being caught than a
desire to maintain a positive self-relationship. It is
this self-relationship that captures much of what
Etzioni has described as the relationship between
the valuative self and the self-interest seeking self.
Positive relationships between persons i and
j, represented by the social capital coefficient K,, is
a rcsourcc for both i and j. It may permit j to
extract favors and concessions from i not available
otherwise. For person i, it represents an opportunity
for an increased sense of well-being resulting from
improvement in ]“’s condition.
Social, physical, and human capital have
similar properties. For example, social capital can
be depreciated over time and by use. Investments
in social capital occur through positive interactions
between i and j that may include the exchange of
gifts and price concessions. The similarities
between social, physical, and human capital suggest
that social capital can be studied using the standard
economic tools. That is, investing and disinvcsting
in social capital may be viewed as an economic
problem of resource allocation.
Opportunities to invest in social capital
may often lead to utility-maximizing solutions
inconsistent with the assumption of selfishness of
preferences. Consequently, investments in social
capital may lead to transactions that may occur at
nonmarket prices and outside of formal markets.
These exchanges outside of formal markets at
nonmarket prices may not be examples of market
failures but instead represent investments in social
capital.
The social capital model accounts for
relationships and values in the following way. The
ithperson is assumed to maximize the function:
[
,,
Max u,= u, K,,(x) n,(x), ~ K,,(x) rc(x)
Y ,=1 1(1)
subject to x being Icss than or equal to an upper
limit on i’s time and resources available for building
social capital. Variables n, and n, represent income
or other measures of i and j’s well-being.
The social capital model in equation (I)
suggests several utility-maximizing opportunities
that are ignored in most neoclassical models. These
have been described recently by Robison and
Schmid ( 1994). For example, consider the case
where i cannot influence n, significantly. This may
be the case when j is one’s alma mater, public
radio, or favorite charity. In this case, person i may
.still contribute some of his or her resources to j
because it increases K,, and thus increases i’s utility.
In other cases, efforts to increase n, may reduce K,,
and K,,. When increasing revenue conflicts with
maintaining or increasing social capital, trade-offs
arc made between revenue and social capital.
Social Capital and Cooperation
Social capital may be important when firms
and persons known to each other agree to share the
costs and benefits of a joint venture. Examples of
cooperative groups include landlord and tenants,
parent-teacher organizations, producer groups,
buying clubs, and formal coopcmtives. The social
capital that exists between persons representing their
respective firms influences the agreement to share
benefits and costs and the willingness to divert
resources away from the production of a private
good to the production of a joint good. What
follows demonstrates important effects of social
capital on total output and distribution of output of
firms that produce independently and jointly
produced products.
Assume two firms i and ,j have resource
endowments X. and yO, respectively. With their
endowments, firms i and ,j can produce a product
alone or they can cooperate and invest part of their
endowments to produce a joint product. Assume
firm i invests x and firm ,j invests y of their
endowments to produce a joint product n” (x ,,Y).
Furthermore, assume that rcr’’(x,0) = rcr’(O,y) = O
and d2rc’’/t?xdy > 0. After investing in the joint
product, firms i and ,j revest the remainder of their
endowments to produce private goods, from which
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respectively. Finally, assume the prices of the
individually and jointly produced outputs are 1.
Thus, no distinction is made between revenue and
output,
Joint production agreements require firms
to determine how to share output. In this case,
assume the agreement is for firms i and j to share
equally the jointly produced good.2
Then, i’s revenue or outputs equals:
7C,= n’(xo -.x) + mr’(x,y)/2 (2)
Similarly, fimj’s revenue is:
7’C, = 7t’(yo-y) + rcr’(x,-y)/2 (3)
Finally, properties are assumed for n, and n, that
permit a unique maximum. These proper-ties
include increasing and concave functions for rciand
n,.
Next, consider how social capital influences
i and j’s resource allocations of x and y. Consider
two persons, i and j, whose social capital
coefficients toward each other are K,, and K,,,
respectively. Persons i andj seek to maximize their
utility functions described next in equations (4) and
(5):
[1 ] +K,, (4)




max U,(r?i+K,,n) = r-c’+~ n“ +K,,Tr
Y
Note that equations (4) and (5) are specific
representations of the general social capital utility
model described in equation (1) where K,, =K,, = 1
and choices of x are assumed not to alter
significantly existing levels of social capital.q
In equations (4) and (5), it is assumed that
the relationship between own social capital weighted
revenue and other social capital weighted revenue is
linear. The justification for this approach is that an
additive utility form reduces the object of
maximization to a single term and keeps the focus
on social capital rather than complex mathematical
forms. We further assume that U, and U, are
increasing and concave in x and y, respectively, so
that second-order conditions hold.
First-order conditions for i’s andj’s utility
timctions can be written as:
(7)
Society’s Interest in Cooperation Between Firms
The well-being of society is described by
its societal welfare function assumed here to be the
sum of the utility functions of its members i and j.4
It is described below:
Max U’(K,,rr,, K,,n,) = (1 +K,, )mj+(l +K,, )rc,
,,1,
(8)
The implications of the societal welfare
function described in equation (8) are considered
next. Society prefers more income to less-–primarily
because the more that is produced the more society
has available for its citizens. Society also has an
interest in i’s revenue relative to j’s. History has
taught that support for societal laws and institutions
depends on economic rewards being perceived as
fair; and what is considered fair is related to the
distribution of revenue. Thus, other things equal,
society prefers a more equal distribution of revenue.
On the other hand, controlled economies have
demonstrated that redistributive efforts to equalize
revenue often discourage efforts that would increase
total output if a greater portion of the reward were
returned to the producer,
As a result of these conflicting goals for
equality and individual incentives, each society
chooses a trade-off between the two competing
goals,f To describe society’s choices, we introduce50 RalIMon and Hanson: Social Capital and Ecanontic Cooperation
the revenue possibility curve in figure 1. On the
vertical axis is firm i’s revenue, n,. On the
horizontal axis is j’s revenue, n,. At the origin in
figure 1 n,, n, # O. The curved line, ,4B, represents
all efficient resource allocations for individual and
joint production possible for firms i and j. The
intercepts on the horizontal and vertical axes for
curved line AB represent the maximum values for Z,
and n,.
Total revenue in figure 1, (n, +n,), is
measured by the intercept of lines drawn to points
on the frontier with slope of negative one.
Differences in revenue (n, -n, ) arc measured
horizontally or vertically from the frontier to the 45°
line originating at the origin. So at point C, total
output is measured as the value of the horizontal or
vertical intercept of the line with slope of negative
onc passing through point C and difference in
revenue between i and j is measured as C’C, the
vertical distance from C to the 45” line originating
from the origin.
inefficient combinations of resources in
figure I are interior to solutions described by ,4B
and less desired from society’s perspective for the
following reason. For every point interior to AB,
there is a point on the frontier that provides a higher
level of total revenue (n, +n, ) for a given difference
in revenue (n, –n, ) or (n, –n,). To illustrate, note
that beginning at interior point, D’ in figure 1, total
revenue can be increased without increasing
difference in revenue by moving to point D the
frontier on a 45” ray.
Total revenue and the difference in revenue
measured at all points on the frontier in figure 1can
be mapped to figure 2 as total revenue-equity
frontier AB. All points interior to AB in figure 1
are also interior to AB in figure 2. In figure 2, the
movement from D’ to D involves moving vertically
from point D’ to point D. Alternatively, moving
from C’ to C in figures I and 2 increases both total
revenue and difference in revenue. In figure 2, this
movement is in the northeast direction.
If maximum total revenue occurred where
the difference in revenue between i andj was zero,
society could achieve both its goals of maximizing
revenue while minimizing differences in revenue.
This fortunate result occurs only when n, and n, are
identical functions. When the functions are not
identical, it is still possible that increasing total
revenue and decreasing differences in revenue can
be achieved simultaneously. Only when moving
from C to E in figure 2 must society choose
between increasing total revenue or reducing
differences in revenues.
Maximization of the arguments of the
societal welfare function can be shown to always
lead to a solution on the frontier in figures 1 and 2.
That solutions to societal’s welfare function always
lead to solutions on the total revenue-equity frontier
are obwous. For any point interior to the frontier,
increasing n, or n, will always increase society’s
welfare. Thus, all societal solutions are on the total
revenue-equity frontier as long as social capital
coefficients are not strongly negative.




It is useful to compare society’s first-order
conditions for x and y with i and j’s first-order
conditions. First-order conditions for x in equations
(6) and (9) and yin equations (7) and (10) solve for
the same values of x and y when:
(11)
Private solutions for x and y when the
relationship between K,, and K,, is different than
expressed in equation (I 1) will result in solutions,1. Agr and Applied .Econ Jali:, 1995










Figure 2, A Societal Efficiency Frontier Measured as Maximum Total
for Given Differencesin Revenue










considered inefficient by society. Included in the
set of inefficient solutions are those interior to the
frontier in figures I and2.
It is demonstrated in the Appendix that if
Ki, and K,, both increase in responscto an event cx,
then total revenue increases. What happens to the
difference in revenue in response to increases in
social capital depends on the location of the initial
solution and the location of the maximum of total
revenue relative to the difference in revenue in
figure 2.
Empirical Results
To empirically test the main conclusions
deduced for cooperating firms from the social
capital model, the following test was conducted.
Senior-level students in the College of Agricultural
and Natural Rcsourccs at Michigan State University
take a capstone course on team building. The teams
are assigned arbitrarily. Students must dccidc how
to allocate their time between preparing for exams
and team efforts to prepare case studies. Grades are
based on the combined total of points earned by
students on their individual exams and joint
projects, The decisions students actually faced
matched those of the economic cooperation model
described in this paper.
The survey asked students to indlcatc the
portion of their time they would allocate to the joint
project knowing in advance the portion of time thclr
partners allocated to the joint project. To help52 Robi.son and Hanson: Social Capital and Economic Cooperation
students make their time allocation decision, they
were provided a table indicating the points possible
for themselves and their partner depending on their
choice and the decision already made by their
partner. If students acted selfishly, they would
select a time allocation that would maximize their
total points independent of their team member’s
score. This was rarely the selection made by the
students.
The empirical test resulted from
maximizing x in equation (6) where n, and n, were
defined to be total points earned on individual and
joint projects by agents i and j after allocating
O-,y< 1 portion of their time to the joint project.
Since y was already chosen by agent j, agent i
solves equation (6) for his or her utility-maximizing
solution for x rewritten here as:
act a7c,
_ = -K,, —
ax ax
(12)
Students taking the survey were asked to
consider three possible teammates: a friend, a
stranger, and an obnoxious cheat. The students
were then asked to record the least amount they
would sell to their teammates a used computer
valued at $600. We assumed that the premium or
discount P,, offered by the students to each of their
three possible partners was related to the student’s
social capital toward their partners.
A second factor used to predict the
students’ time allocation was the difference between
the maximum points possible for i, n!, and the
points j would earn if i selected rr~, n,(n!). We
defined this difference as M,, = # -x, (rc~). In an
earlier study, Robison and Schmid (1989) found that
when important relationships existed, differences in
wealth were significant influences in economic
exchanges. Differences in points were assumed to
produce a similar effect. Thus, K,, was expressed
as:
K,, = ~1 + l$p,, + ~q”r, (13)
To estimate equation (12) required
observations for 8X, 18x and drc, Idy. Values used
for dZ,lax were the difference between the point
maximizing value for i, rc?, and the actual points
selected by i, n;. The difference in corresponding
point values for j that depended on i’s choices,
x,(x!) and n,(rc~), was used to estimate d n, /dx.
Call the estimates of dn, /ax and an, /ax, Arc,/&x
and Arc,/Ax, respectively. Then, in equation (12),
we substitute A7C,fAX, AZ, /AX, and the right-hand
side of equation (13). The resulting equation to be
estimated after adding a constant 130to account for
omitted variables was written as:
ATC,/AX = PO + ~, A7C, tfw + ~2[P,, A7C, b-x]
+ P3 J’f,, AZ, tAX
(14)
Estimated values of PO,p,, @z,and 13~with their t
statistics in parentheses are:
AZ, iAX = i.21 + .14 A?’C, /AX + .00073 P,, A7L,/u
(3.69) (6.59) (3.57)
+ .025 kf,l AiT,/AX
(25.31) (15)
with ~2 = .87.
The coefficients in equation (14) should not
have been significant if students maximized their
total points. The significance of ~z suggests
relationships measured by the subsidy or premium
associated with the sale of the used computer was
significant in predicting the point subsidy or
premium of points agent i gave to agent j. The
significance of ~~suggests that differences in points
or viewing oneself as having more than one’s
partner was also significant. This variable may also
be related to the concept of fairness.
The empirical outcomes of this study based
on mind experiments are supported by the results of
numerous other studies using dollar outcomes.
These studies take the following form. Agent i is
given a certain dollar amount a part of which i must
allocate to agent j. If j agrees with the allocation,
the transaction is completed. If j rejects i’sJ Agr. and Applied Econ , July, 1995 53
proposed allocation, i and j receive nothing.
Regardless of j’s acceptance or rejection of i’s
offer, the game is not repeated.
Selfishness of preferences would suggest
that since the game is not repeated, i would propose
an allocation favorable to himself and that agent j
would accept any positive allocation, In fact, most
allocations are nearly equal. Moreover, when
allocations do reflect selfishness of preferences,
agent ,j often rejects the allocation (Guth,
Sdhmittberger, and Schwarze).
The results of this study and those played
with dollar outcomes support the hypothesis that
social capital coefficients are not zero. The results
also suggest that as social capital between students
i and j increases, students are willing to contribute
more to the joint project.
Social Capital and Policy Recommendations
When social capital increases between
firms, cooperation and total revenue increase,
Moreover, increased levels of social capital may
increase the likelihood that firms will adopt more
nearly equal revenue distribution plans. Institutions
most likely to have levels of social capital needed to
achieve desirable levels of output and revenue
distribution are families. Thus, we might expect
that family-based firms have certain social capital
advantages not often available to other firms.
Nelton wrote that an Oregon survey
showed that 76 percent of the state’s small
companies, those that have fewer than 50
employees, are exclusively family-owned. An
additional 19 percent of small companies in Oregon
are privately owned and include non-family owners.
Calonius provided other evidence of the
importance of family businesses. He wrote:
“,..some 75 percent of U.S.
companies are family owned or
controlled. They produce 60
percent of the gross national
product. They grew faster than
non-family firms did in the 1980s.
And they’re expected to continue
as the backbone of the economy
well into the 2 Ist century. One-
third of the Fortune 500
companies are family firms.
Family businesses employ more
than 40 million people. The bad
news about family business is that
most don’t survive into the second
generation.”
Another implication of this study is that
inadequate or negative social capital may lead some
firms to fail. If some firms fail economically for
lack of social capital, economists may not be the
ones best equipped to help them solve their
problems. Recognizing that sociologists and other
social scientists may have more expertise in
building social capital suggests the need for
economists and other social scientists to cooperate.
Furthermore, recognizing that families may have
comparative advantages for building social capital,
it may be that wise economic policies should
include policies that tend to strengthen families.
Conclusions and Recommendations
An increasing amount of evidence suggests
that relationships matter. This paper demonstrated
how the influence of relationships can be
incorporated in the neoclassical utility-maximizing
model by using social capital coefficients. This
paper has also shown how important new policy
insights may be deduced from the social capital
model. One important conclusion is that the success
of a society’s economic plan may be limited by its
social capital. While there is obviously much more
work to be done, early empirical work reported in
this study and elsewhere support the conclusion that
relationships may influence in important ways, our
efforts to cooperate.
Perhaps the most important conclusion
from this work is the following. If relationships are
important and influence the level and distribution of
revenue, then our economic recommendations must
include recommendations for building and
maintaining social capital. Recommendations that
alter social capital investments will require much
additional work to measure social capital and its
costs of formation. Clearly, economists have much
to learn about what determines social capital and54 Rohon and Hanson: Social Capi[al and Economic Cooperation
suggests the need to study its influence in ignoring social capital will sterilize many of the
economics in cooperation with sociologists or other remedies prescribed by economists based on
social scientists. selfishness of preferences. On the other hand,
accounting for social capital in our prescriptions
may lead us to cooperate more with other social
If social capital is an important economic sciences including sociologists, to develop new and
variable, as the results of this study suggest, improved solutions to very old problems,
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Kfa) and ‘] ‘KI~ . K,(et) and assume that
dK, dK
—= _> (). Then,
2 2 X’ da
beginning with first-order conditions (6) and (7) we differentiate x and y with respect to a. The results are:
where:
Next, it is demonstrated that (x,+x,) increase with increases in K, and K, resulting from an increase
in w The derivative of (z + ~ ) with respect to cxcan be written as:
/
It can be determined that the bracketed expressions are positive when x and y in equation (A.3) are
evaluated at their solutions found in equations (6) and (7). Then, since dx /da and dy /da > 0, it follows
that d(n, +n) /dct > 0. Furthermore, as K, and K, increase toward one, the private solutions will approach
the solution represented by the maximum of the societal welfare function.
Endnotes
1. See also Frank, Gilovich, and Regan.
2, To simplify the analysis, the assumption is made that output shares are fixed and agents adjust inputs
based on their anticipated share of the output, This is a common practice in leasing where most agents
agree to share the output equally.
3. Obviously, the development of social capital models requires that the influence of investments in social
capital coefficients be examined carefully. Current research by the authors is focused on investments in
social capital. However, the intent here is to describe in an elementary way how social capital coefficients
can be used to extend altruism models developed in a neoclassical framework.58 ~otjt,~on and Hanson: SOCIU1Cu,vlia[ and Economic Cooperation
4, Socict y is not assumed to have rcdistributlve powers cxccpt those achicvcd through Its choice of .x and
J’.
5 po]ltlcai cornmelltator, G,F, Will, reflects this conflict when he wrote: “Democrats may ride to victory
over the rubbic of Reagan’s reputation, but in doing so they will reacquire the bad habit of subordinating
ccooornlc growth to shifting considerations of “fairness. ” Okun also addresses the issues of efficiency
versus equity,